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1971] CASE COMMENTS
Americans who work abroad. This determination must be made on the
basis of foreign policy with regard to nontax considerations, but an
attempt should be made to apply the section equally to all Americans who
work abroad.
JAMES W. JENNINGS, JR.
INNKEEPERS' LIENS AND THE REQUIREMENTS
OF DUE PROCESS
The vast majority of American states have enacted statutory liens'
giving innkeepers, hotel owners, and boardinghouse keepers' a lien on the
baggage and other personal property of their guests3 for charges due.
These charges take the form of rent and any other services supplied by the
'ALA. CODE tit. 33, § 29 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-951 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 71-1111 (Repl. Vol. 1957); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1861 (West Supp. 1971); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 86-1-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-68 to -69 (1958); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 713.68 (1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 52-105 (1961); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 28, § 507-
7 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 39-1826 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 71, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 37-206 (Repl. Vol. 1949); IOWA CODE ANN. § 583.2 (1950); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 36-201 (1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.340 (1969); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art.
3233 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2951 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 71, § 4
(Repl. Vol. 1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, § 23 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.301
(1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.05 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7157 (1952); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 419.060 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 34-103 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 41-
124 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.480 (1967); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 448.1 (1968); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 2A: 44-48 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-3-14 (1960); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 181
(McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44A-2 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-
19-01 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4721.04 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 501 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.525 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 71 (1954);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-33-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-3 (1962); S.D. CODE § 44-
11-5 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1701 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. § 4594 (1960);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-2 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-31 (Repl. Vol. 1970); WASH. REv.
CODE § 60.64.010 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.43
(1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-249 (1959).
2These three classes of persons will be referred to as a unit by the term "innkeepers". An
innkeeper was one who, at common law, kept an inn for the lodging and entertainment of
travelers, their attendants and horses for compensation. Boardinghouses and the keepers
thereof were not viewed in the same light at common law as were innkeepers. J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 475 (9th ed. 1878). Today, on the other hand,
boardinghouse keepers have been given statutory liens on the boarder's property much like
those given to innkeepers and hotel owners. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.68 (1969).
3A person attains the status of a guest at an inn or hotel when he requests shelter and is
accepted for such purposes by the hotel owner. The length of time one stays at a hotel does
not alter the status of "guest" as long as he maintains his transient character. E. C.
GODDARD, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 174 (2d ed. C. Cullen
1928).
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innkeeper.' The lien arises when the services are furnished,5 thus giving the
innkeeper the right to immediate possession and the ability to detain the
property of the guest until the charges are fully paid.' The statutes creating
the innkeepers' liens do not normally give the lienee any right to notice or
a hearing before imposition of the lien upon his property.7 In addition, the
statutes usually allow the innkeeper to execute the lien through public sale
without a hearing and after some appropriate notice.
8
In Klim v. Jones,' a federal district court held that the California
statute"0 creating innkeepers' liens was unconstitutional as violative of due
process since it did not provide for notice or a hearing before the lienee's
property was detained." Klim, an irregularly employed painter, was a
guest at the Junior Tar Hotel in San Francisco. He paid rent on a room of
ten dollars per week either in cash or by doing work around the hotel. On
the day rent was due, Klim was awakened by Jones, the manager of the
hotel, who demanded five dollars which allegedly represented "unpaid"
rent. When Klim protested that he had paid his rent in full for the week,
Jones padlocked him out of his room. Inside the room were all of Klim's
belongings, including his painting tools and identification papers, which
were essential in seeking and obtaining employment.
Klim filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the
California statute creating the innkeepers' liens was unconstitutional. The
district court found that it had jurisdiction under either federal civil rights
legislation 2 or pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. Following this
determination, the court held that because the statute lacked any
provision for notice or a hearing prior to detention of the property it was
violative of due process and therefore unconstitutional."
At common law, an innkeeper was under a duty, subject to a very few
'J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 475 (9th ed. 1878).
5E.g., People ex rel. Klamt v. Loeffler, 153 Misc. 781, 276 N.Y.S. 698 (N.Y. City Ct.
1934).
'When an innkeeper's lien arises, the lienor is generally given the right to immediately
impose the lien upon the property of the guest. This is usually provided for in the statutes by
the term "detain". E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-68 (1958).
WSee note I supra.
sNotice requirements vary from state to state. Generally, if the address or whereabouts
of the owner of the property is unknown, notice by publication is required over a stated
period of time, usually 10-30 days, before the innkeeper may dispose of the property by
public sale. E.G., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1112 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
'315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861 (West Supp. 1971).
"1315 F. Supp. at 124.
"Id. at 113-15. Jurisdiction is conferred upon federal district courts to redress any
deprivation of rights granted individuals by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
3315 F. Supp. at 115-17.28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
"4315 F. Supp. at 124.
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exceptions, to admit a traveler and his possessions to the inn. 5 Concurrent
with this duty, the innkeeper was considered an extraordinary bailor of the
property which a guest brought to the inn," and was held accountable for
most damage or loss to that property."7 To offset this extraordinary
liability of the innkeeper, the common law gave him a reciprocal right,
commensurate with his duties, in the form of a lien upon the property of
his guest for charges due."
Unlike the common law which placed extraordinary liability on the
ihnkeeper for the losses his guests might bear, the modern statutes
generally set a monetary limit upon the liability of innkeepers for loss or
damage to their guests' property, 9 while at the same time retaining a lien
capability similar to that provided by common law.20 Most state statutes
do not currently provide for a hearing before imposition of an innkeeper's
lien, but there is a great diversity of approach among the various
jurisdictions.
2'
While these statutes have remained substantially as they were when
first enacted, the decisions construing the safeguards necessary to satisfy
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause have
had a long and involved history in American jurisprudence. 22 It is
considered basic to procedural due process to give a person notice and an
opportunity to be heard before he may be deprived of life, liberty, or
property. 23 In Schroeder v. City of New York,24 the United States
"Perrine v. Paulos, 100 Cal. App. 2d 655, 224 P.2d 41 (1950); Vansant v. Kowalewski,
21, Del. (5 Boyce) 92, 90 A. 421 (1914); Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296
N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); State v. Steele, 106 N.C. 766, 11
S.E. 478 (1890). See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
"He was so considered by the custom of the realm principally because of the lawless
character of the times. It was hoped that by imposing this extraordinary liability the English
inns would become places of relative safety for travelers. E.C. GODDARD, OtrrLINs OF THE
LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 161 (2d ed. C. Cullen 1928).
1Id. at §§ 181-86. Damage or loss for which the innkeeper would not be held
accountable was limited to acts of God and other losses similarly beyond his control.
181d. at § 187.
"E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 37-105 to -110 (Repl. Vol. 1949).
29For instance, Alaska has not enacted a statutory innkeeper's lien and apparently
follows the common law approach. ALASKA STAT. §§ 01.10.010, 08.56.060 (1962). On the
other hand, in two states the statutes go so far as to declare that innkeepers shall have the
right to possession of the guest's property and ability to detain when the debt becomes dues
"without the process of law." HAWAII REV. LAWS tit. 28, § 507-7 (1968); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A: 44-48 (1952). Finally, South Carolina may be the only state whose statutory lien
presently requires a hearing before it may be imposed upon the guest's property. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-1711 (1962). But see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2 to -3 (1962).
22For an interesting collection of cases, see DOWLING & GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796-924 (8th ed. 1970).
"Perhaps the best statement of this proposition by the Supreme Court is:
[T]he Due Process Clause ...at a minimum ... require[s] that 3 076
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Supreme Court interpreted the notice and opportunity to be heard
requirement by saying,
[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."
Using this interpretation, the Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,26 struck down a Wisconsin statute 27 permitting
prejudgment wage garnishment. Family Finance Corporation brought a
garnishment action against Mrs. Sniadach as defendant and her employer
as garnishee. The complaint was for $420 allegedly owing on a promissory
note. Service was made on the garnishee and Mrs. Sniadach on the same
day and pursuant to the Wisconsin procedure the garnishee reported that
it would pay one-half of the wages under its control due to the defendant
as a subsistence allowance and retain the remainder subject to the order of
the court. 21 Mrs. Sniadach then moved to dismiss the garnishment action,
claiming that it failed to satisfy due process. The Supreme Court held that
absent certain special circumstances which may justify a summary
procedure," a person must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard before his wages may be garnished." The Sniadach opinion focused
upon the specialized property of wages, the deprivation of which may
work so great a hardship on the wage earner and his family that due
process requires a preliminary hearing before they may be garnished.3'
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
-371 U.S. 208 (1962).
25d. at 211, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
-395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2'Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (1958),formerly 267.17 (1957).
21395 U.S. at 338. The Wisconsin statutes provide that up to one-half of the wages for
one week may be paid to the defendant. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (1965),formerly 267.17
(1957).
2 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of impure foods);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (suspension of bank officers); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (suspension of commodity credit); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921) (bond requirement for out-of-state defendant); North American Cold Storage Co.
v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (destroying impure food); R.A. Holman & Co. v. S.E.C.,
299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (suspension of exemption from registration requirements).
18395 U.S. at 342.
"1Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that the garnished wages might be unfrozen if the
wage earner later won on the merits. But in Sniadach it was the deprivation of the wages
during the interim period without any opportunity to be heard which made the statute un-
constitutional. Id. at 339.
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Although Klim extended the Sniadach holding by requiring notice and
a hearing prior to imposition of an innkeeper's lien, generally liens of this
type have in the past been found not to violate due process.32 In cases in
which the necessity for the due process requirements of notice and a
hearing have been questioned, the courts have employed a balancing test
to weigh the countervailing public and private interests.3 This test is based
on the concept that the nature and extent of the private interest subjected
to the summary procedure should be weighed against the competing
interests of society which are served by quick and decisive action. 3
Although the requirements of due process through use of the balancing
test tend to promote the private interest concerned, the requirements may
be obviated where an exceptional situation is presented.
Even though prejudgment wage garnishment may once have been
viewed as an extraordinary situation, u it is no longer viewed as such
because wages constitute special property, the deprivation of which
creates unusual hardships.? In reaching this result, the Supreme Court in
Sniadach did not explicitly employ the balancing test in deciding whether
the Wisconsin statute provided adequate procedures to meet the due
process requirements but rather dealt with it summarily saying
[w]here the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior
hearing this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the
fundamental principles of due process.38
Sniadach was correctly limited 39 to the question of the
32E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72 N.W. 765 (1897); L.E. Lines Music
Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933); Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302
(1907); Nance v. O.K. Houck Piano Co., 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 1172 (1913).
"E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F.
Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
340ne often cited opinion has described the balancing test:
JT]o determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the
Court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private
interest affected, and of the government interest involved, taking account
of history and the precise circumstances surrounding the case at hand.
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807,811 (2d Cir. 1967).
nE.g., cases cited note 29 supra.
3tSee also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
31395 U.S. at 340-42.
uJd. at 342.
3'A good statement of this limitation is,
[t]he Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
1971]
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constitutionality of the Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment
statute,4" and therefore did not discuss what forms of property other than
wages may be constitutionally protected by notice and a prior hearing. In
Klim the court found notice and a hearing essential before the personal
property of a hotel guest could be seized subject to an innkeeper's lien.
The current approach of the Supreme Court to the problem is
evidenced by the recent holding in Goldberg v. Kelly." The issue before
the court was whether due process required notice and an evidentiary
hearing before a state administrative agency could discontinue welfare
benefits.4 In concluding that due process does require such a procedure,
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the court, stated:
[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss," and depends upon whether
the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the
governmental interest in summary adjudication."
Thus the Supreme Court, returning to the balancing test," has added
welfare benefits, similar in many ways to wages, to the growing list of
property subject to the procedural safeguards announced in Sniadach. s
Procedural safeguards, under the influence of Sniadach, have also been
extended to other forms of property,"6 with particular protection afforded
personal property necessary "for ordinary day-to-day living."'"
While due process has been extended to various forms of property,
similar extensions have been created to remedy procedural defects.
Because Sniadach was limited to the particular factual situation
decision of the case." The Court will not "formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied."
Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
ItWis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01 etseq. (1965).
"1397 U.S. 254 (1970).
421d. The issue has arisen in other cases. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970);
Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43397 U.S. at 262-63.
4"d.
41A court prior to the Supreme Court's determination of Goldberg had extended
Sniadach to cover public assistance payment procedures. Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp.
1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
4Leary v. Heard, 2 Pov. L. Rptr. 11,199 (Cal. Mun. Ct. 1969) (attachment of bank
account); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., - Minn. _ 176 N.W.2d 87
(1970) (accounts receivable); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969)
(proceeds of airline ticket sales).
47Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). See Mihans
v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970).
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presented," the Court did not disclose whether summary procedures other
than prejudgment garnishment should be reevaluated as to their
constitutionality.49 In Klim the court extended Sniadach, declaring notice
and a hearing to be procedural prerequisites to the imposition of an
innkeeper's lien upon a guest's property. 50 In Mihans v. Municipal
Court,51 the court extended these requirements of procedural due process
to the method by which writs of immediate possession are obtained in
unlawful detainer actions. The court declared the California unlawful
detainer statute52 to be constitutionally unsound because, under an
alternate procedure provided by the statute, a landlord was able to obtain
a writ of immediate possession prior to a hearing.0 It was held that the
continued use of rented property, like wages, was of itself a valuable right
worthy of constitutional protection.1
Utilizing language similar to that of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Sniadach,55 the court in Mihans said that the ex parte
appearance of the landlord before a judicial officer was not a substitute
for the prior hearing compelled by due process because it was not "aimed
at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity"" of the
claimed debt."
Because the majority opinion in Sniadach made it clear that all
summary procedures which have the effect of "taking" property do not
necessarily violate due process,5 8 some courts have been quick to hold that
Sniadach's due process requirements should not be extended to proced-
"Note 39 supra.
"See generally Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditor's Remedies: Some
Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 Am. U. L. REv. 158 (1970).
-315 F. Supp. at 124.
537 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970).
52CAL. CiV. CODE § 1166a (West 1954).
n7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 484, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20.
"Id.
-1395 U.S. at 342-43.
mid. at 343.
577 Cal. App. 3d at 488, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 23. In addition courts have extended the
procedural requirements of Sniadach to welfare discontinuation procedures of
administrative agencies. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Federal
agency discharge procedures have also been held to these requirements. Ricucci v. United
States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct. Cl. 1970). These requirements have also been extended to the
process of obtaining judgments by anticipatory confessions. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1970). Sniadach's procedural requirements have likewise been extended to the
process of obtaining writs of replevin for personal property. Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
"395 U.S. at 339.
1971]
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ures beyond the prejudgment garnishment situation. 59 In City Finance Co.
of Mt. Ranier v. Williams" the court held Sniadach inapplicable to
prejudgment garnishment where the defendant debtor in the garnishment
action was a non-resident. The majority opinion in Sniadach stated that
the creditor could easily have obtained in personam jurisdiction over the
resident debtor." The court in City Finance used this statement in
declaring that prejudgment garnishment of a non-resident debtor's
property was an extraordinary situation allowing the unusual process of
garnishment without notice or a hearing.
62
Courts distinguishing Sniadach have declined to apply the procedural
requirements of that opinion to such other summary procedures as default
sales arising from a breach of a conditional sales contract 3 and
anticipatory confession judgments." Prior to Klim, the California
Supreme Court refused to decide whether prejudgment garnishment or
attachment of property other than wages violated due process. 5
Some courts, as well as refusing to extend Sniadach to procedures
beyond garnishment, have not extended it to forms of property other than
wages." In Robinson v. Loyola Foundation,"7 Sniadach was held not to
apply to attachment of real property because "[s]uch proceeding does not
create the evils nor result in the hardships which often follow the
garnishment of wages owed to a worker."'" Likewise, other courts have
found that due process does not require notice or hearing before
"Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (enforcement of a
security interest); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969)
(property other than wages); Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., I I Ariz. App.
571, 466 P.2d 790 (1970) (funds in garnishee's hands not wages); Strutt v. Ontario Savings
and Loan Ass'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 547, 90 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1970) (foreclosure of mortgage);
Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969) (garnishment of bank
account); City Finance Co. of Mt. Ranier v. Williams, 2 Pov. L. Rptr. 10,388 (D.C. Ct. of
Gen. Sess. 1969) (garnishment of non-resident debtor's property); Robinson v. Loyola
Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970) (attachment distinguished from levy);
Hehr v. Tucker, - Ore. _ 472 P.2d 797 (1970) (not prejudgment garnishment).
"2 Pov. L. Rptr. § 10,388 (D.C. Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1969).
1395 U.S. at 339.
£22 Pov. L. Rptr. § 10,388 (D.C. Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1969). See also note 29 supra.
"Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970).
"Cf Lebanon Valley Nat'l Bank v. Henning, 436 Pa. 446, 260 A.2d 462 (1970)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
"People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 910,464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670
(1970).
"Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Termplan Inc. v.
Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Sackin v. Kersting, 10 Ariz. App. 340,
458 P.2d 544 (1969); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969);
Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970).
'7236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970).
"Id. at 159.
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garnishment of bank accounts 69 and notice before foreclosure of
mortgages.
70
Regardless of the specific property or summary procedure involved,
the courts apparently have either explicitly or implicitly used a balancing
test to determine in each instance whether due process requires notice and
a prior hearing.7' One reason that the balancing test may not be used, or
may be used implicitly without actual discussion of it in the opinion, is
that the property taken or procedure involved creates such a hardship that
the result of a detailed balancing test is obvious to the court.
72
Some courts have reached opposite results when confronted with the
same procedural question involving like property or summary process.
73
However, this may be due to the lack of guidelines in Sniadach for a
determinative test or the lack of an express balancing test from that
opinion.
7'
Another reason for the diverse conclusions based upon similar
processes or property forms is the adoption by some courts of the strict
due process argument made by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Sniadach.75 Courts espousing this approach tend to
deemphasize the specific property involved and instead focus upon the
necessity of notice and a hearing in advance of any deprivation of the use
of the debtor's property.
7'
These cases strongly suggest that when the specific property subjected
to the summary process is necessary for the maintenance of health, day-
to-day necessities or family welfare, due process will require a hearing
prior to any interference with the debtor's right to possession or use.
77
However, if the property in question does not share these unique qualities,
then due process will most likely not protect it where there exists the valid
state or creditor interest in having quick, decisive action.
7
1
Irrermplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Michael's
Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969).
7 Strutt v. Ontario Savings and Loan Ass'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 547, 90 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1970).
7 See note 38 and accompanying text supra. See note 34 supra.
"E.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
73Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25
N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1970). Contra, Jamerson v. Lennox, 321 F.
Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
7395 U.S. at 342.
711d. at 342-44.
71E.g., Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479,484, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1970).
7See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970);
Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. I1l. 1969); Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc.,
Minn. - 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
78See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270,463 P.2d 68 (1969).
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